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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Exclusive Remedy Provision - Application to Partnerships

A.

In Daniels v. Roumillat,' plaintiff sought a common law tort
recovery against an individual partner in addition to having
received workmen's compensation benefits from the partnership
and its carrier. The South Carolina Supreme Court, affirming the
lower court's decision, held that all members of the partnership
constitute employers2 as intended by the Workmen's Compensation Act,3 and therefore the common law action was barred under
the exclusive remedy provision of the Act.4 Furthermore, the
court held that an employee is in the course of his employment
while traveling to and from
work when the transportation is fur5
nished by the employer.

Robert Daniels worked as a laborer for Martin and Roumillat
Builders, a South Carolina partnership engaged in the construction of residential homes in Dorchester County. It was customary
for defendant-Roumillat to provide transportation both to and
from the job site as Daniels resided approximately twenty miles
away in Summerville. On September 13, 1973, Roumillat was
transporting Daniels from the job site to his home in a pickup
truck owned by the partnership. Upon arrival in Summerville,
Daniels disembarked from the truck, proceeded around the rear
thereof, and was struck and injured by an automobile as he was
attempting to cross the road. Eight months later, Daniels filed a
claim for workmen's compensation benefits with the South Carolina Industrial Commission, asserting that the injury arose out of
and in the course of his employment with the partnership. The
partnership and its carrier denied the claim but later decided to
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

264 S.C. 497, 216 S.E.2d 174 (1975).
Id. at 503, 216 S.E.2d at 177.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1 to 602 (1962 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-121 (1962); see text accompanying note 8 infra.
264 S.C. at 501, 216 S.E.2d at 176.
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settle. Daniels was paid $7,800 for disability and $3,842 for medical expenses in return for a full release of all further claims.
Nevertheless, the release stated that "the employer specifically
denies that the alleged injury arose out of or during the course of
employment" and denies "the employee is entitled to any
compensation whatsoever." 8 The settlement was approved by the
7
Industrial Commission.
Thereafter, plaintiff sought damages in the Charleston
County Court of Common Pleas based on the negligence of Roumillat. The defendant contested the action by asserting that the
benefits received under the settlement constituted a bar to the
plaintiffs suit under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act:
The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee
when he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this
Title, respectively, to pay and accept compensation on account
of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all other
rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin as against his employer,
at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of
service or death.8
The lower court held "that the settlement under the Adkins Release which was entered into by Daniels and approved by the
Industrial Commission had the effect of an award by the Industrial Commission" 9 and barred the action.
The supreme court, in affirming the decision, dealt first with
the issue of whether the injury arose during the course of employment. Daniels asserted on appeal that it did not, and therefore,
as the claim was wrongfully paid, section 72-121 did not bar the
action."0 Although the general rule is that an employee traveling
to or from his place of employment is not in the course of employment, the court noted an exception to this rule as enunciated by
Professor Larson:
If the trip to and from work is made in a truck, bus, car, or other
vehicle under the control of the employer, an injury during that
trip is incurred in the course of employment. The. . .justifica6. Record at 5.
7. 264 S.C. at 500, 216 S.E.2d at 176.
8. S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 72-121 (1962).

9. Record at 81.
10. Brief and Record for Appellant at 25.
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tion for this holding is that the employer has himself expanded
the range of the employment and the attendant risks."
The court therefore found that the workmen's compensation
claim was rightfully paid. As a result, the question remains open
whether a wrongfully paid claim by the partnership would constitute a bar to a common law action against a partner."
Since the court determined the claim was rightfully paid, it
needed only to focus upon the nature of a partnership to resolve
the issue of exclusive recovery. The controlling question in this
determination would appear to be whether the court characterized Roumillat as an employer, co-employee or "third person."' 3
In most jurisdictions, including South Carolina, an injured
employee may bring a common law action against a "third per11. 264 S.C. at 501, 216 S.E.2d at 176, quoting 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 17.10 at 4-125 to 129 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LARSON] (word added
by court deleted). It might be pointed out that the court does not have to deal with the
limiting affects of the doctrine of frolic and detour in this definition of the scope of
employment. See Boykin v. Prioleau, 225 S.C. 437, 179 S.E.2d 599 (1971); Curtis v. Royal
Indem. Co., 101 Ga. App. 158, 112 S.E.2d 819 (1960).
12. If the sole rationale for permitting the second recovery by plaintiff is the fact that
the compensation claim was erroneously awarded, its reliance is misplaced. In the first
instance, plaintiff would be allowed to assert his claims under the act and later repudiate
those provisions dealing with its exclusivity. It would seem that judicial estoppel would
preclude such a result. But see Boyin v. Prioleau, 225 S.C. 437, 441, 179 S.E.2d 599, 601
(1971). In any event, plaintiff should not be permitted the unjust enrichment of the
wrongfully-paid compensation claim if the second recovery is allowed. Indeed, the original
defendant-employer would be entitled to reimbursement from any recovery in the second
action in the amount of the claim or settlement wrongfully paid in the first action. Id. at
441, 179 S.E.2d at 601.
13. There are currently two theories on viewing the relationship between the partnership and the individual partners - the aggregate or common law theory and the entity
theory. The common law theory views the partnership as an association of persons
whereby each person is an agent for the others in respect to all transactions within the
scope of the partnership business. Under this definition, each individual partner, whether
involved in the particular transaction or not, would be a principal, hence, an employer.
The entity theory views the partnership as separate and distinct from its individual
partners, similar to the relationship between a corporation and its shareholders. The
Uniform Partnership Act, adopted in South Carolina in 1950, gives the partnership both
entity and aggregate characteristics depending on the particular section of the act under
consideration. Uniform Partnership Act, (U.P.A.) - Commissioners' Prefatory Note. The
most significant aggregate feature of the UPA is § 15 which imposes joint or joint and
several liability on the partners. Thus, under the Danielsfactual situation, each individual partner is liable jointly and severally for the payment of workmen's compensation
premiums and therefore, each should be viewed as an employer. Without applying this
analysis, the Daniels court reached the same conclusion. See text accompanying note 16
infra. See generally Monson v. Arcand, 239 Minn. 336, 58 N.W.2d 753 (1953); Williams
v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 69 N.E.2d 557 (1946); Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the
Uniform PartnershipAct an Aggregate or an Entity? 16 VAND. L.R. 377 (1963).
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son."' 4 To determine whether an individual member of the partnership is a third person or whether he is an employer, the Daniels
court again resorted to the views of Professor Larson to find that
the latter was the case. "[A] member of the partnership, even if
he is a 'working partner,' is still in law the employer of employees
of the partnership and cannot be sued. 15 The court noted that
even by classifying the partner to be a co-employee, recovery
would still be precluded by section 72-121.' 6
Thus, the class of those who can be regarded as a "third
person" under section 72-122 has been further narrowed by excluding individual partners in a partnership. Since each partner
would have already contributed to the injured party's award
through premiums or self-insurance, the result appears entirely
proper.
B. DeterminingAverage Weekly Wages in Concurrent
Employments
In Foremanv. Jackson Minit Markets, Inc.," the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld an award of compensation to a
claimant computed by combining wages from two concurrent
employments even though the employee was injured in the course
of only one employment. In so doing, the court ignored the socalled "majority" rule of other states'" and applied what appears
14. See generally 2 LARSON § 71 (1975). S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-122 (1962) provides:
When an employee, his personal representative or other person may have a right
to recover damages for injury, loss of service or death from any person other than
the employer, he may institute an action at law against such third person before
an award is made under this Title and prosecute it to its final determination.
15. 264 S.C. at 502, 216 S.E.2d 176, quoting 2 LARSON § 72.10 at 14-35 (1975). The
court does not approach the subject of the partner who is limited in the partnership to
merely contributing capital. The court would presumably regard him as an employer
proper, but an argument could be made that he is a third person amenable to suit under
the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
16. At first blush, the term "third person" would seemingly include everyone connected with the injury except the employer. However, in South Carolina, although the Act
does not so specifically provide, the term "third person" has been narrowed to exclude
co-employees. Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 73 S.E.2d 449 (1952).
17. 265 S.C. 164, 217 S.E.2d 214 (1975).
18. The majority rule holds that a claimant's earnings from two concurrent employments may be combined only if the employments are related or similar. For example, a
Georgia appellate court in Black v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 123 Ga. App. 133, 179
S.E.2d 679 (1970), applied the concurrent-employment doctrine. In that case claimant
was injured in his part-time job as a courier. He also had a full-time job as supervisor for
a painting company. The Georgia court found the employments were dissimilar and denied the combination of wages.
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to be an equitable interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act.' 9
Robert Foreman worked forty hours per week at $2.30 per
hour for Pierce-Young-Angel Company as a forklift operator. As
a second job, he worked an average of thirty-one hours per week
at $2.00 per hour for Jackson Minit Markets, Inc. as a clerk.
During a robbery of the Minit Market, Foreman was shot and
died one month later as a result of the injuries received. His
dependents, Mary Ann Foreman and Sandra Joan Foreman, his
widow and daughter respectively, filed for benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. At a hearing before a single commissioner, the employer and carrier admitted that the death occurred as a result of injuries received in the course of employment
and was compensable. 2 However, in computing the amount of
compensation to be awarded, the single commissioner determined that the decedent's "average weekly wages" were $154 by
combining the wages from both employments. 2' Applying the
The only possible justification for such a tenuous doctrine is to prevent one industry
from being required to bear the burden of an injury produced by another industry. However, the theory behind the workmen's compensation laws is to provide injured employees
and their dependents rights and remedies-not to deny a claimant his just compensation
merely because he chose two distinct lines of employment. Professor Larson summarizes
adequately the illogic of such a doctrine:
The rule refusing to combine earnings from concurrent employments unless
they are "similar" or "related" is unnecessary from the point of view of statutory
construction, unsound as a matter of accomplishing the purposes of the legislation, inhumane from the point of view of the claimant, and logically absurd as
to the distinctions on which it is based.
2 LARSON § 60.31, at 10-410 (1975).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1 to 602 (1962 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
20. Record at 6.
21. The standard unit by which benefits are measured under most workmen's compensation laws is a fixed statutory percentage of the average weekly wages of the injured
employee. At the time this case arose, the South Carolina Act provided in pertinent part:
If death results proximately from an accident and within two years thereafter
or while total disability still continues and within six years after the accident,
the employer shall pay or cause to be paid, subject, however, to the provisions
of the other sections of this Title, in one of the methods provided in this chapter,
to the dependents of the employee wholly dependent upon his earnings for
support at the time of the accident, a weekly payment equal to sixty percent of
his average weekly wages, but not more than sixty-three dollars nor less than
twenty dollars a week, for a period of four hundred weeks from the date of injury,
and burial expenses not exceeding four hundred dollars.
No. 1167, [19721 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2341 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-180
(Cum. Supp. 1975)). It is therefore crucial to establish as high an "average weekly wage"
as possible. For the statutorily prescribed methods of computing an "average weekly
wage," see note 25 infra.
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compensation rate to his "average weekly wages," claimants were
awarded the then maximum rate of $63.00 per week rather than
the $37.36 per week the claimants would have been entitled to,
had the compensation rate been based upon only the wage rate
of the employment in which the decedent was injured. The full
commission affirmed, 2 and on appeal the lower court also affirmed the award.2 The issue before the supreme court was the
propriety of combining the average weekly wages from two concurrent employments in determining the average weekly wage
under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Compensation for dependents of employees killed during the
scope of their employment was provided by "a weekly payment
equal to sixty percent of his average weekly wages." 4 The first
paragraph of section 72-4 of the Act sets forth four specific methods of ascertaining an employee's average weekly wage based
essentially on dividing his total earnings prior to the injury by the
number of weeks employed. 25 This paragraph commences by stating that, "'average weekly wages' shall mean the earnings of the
The 1974 amendment of this provision extended the amount allowed a claimant to
provide "a weekly payment equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent of his average weekly
wages, but not less than twenty-five dollars a week nor more than two-thirds of the average
weekly wage in this State for the preceding calendar year, for a period of five hundred
" S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-180 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
weeks from the date of the injury ....
22. Record at 16.
23. Id. at 17.
24. See note 21 supra.
25. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72-4 (1962) provides:
"Average weekly wages" shall mean the earnings of the injured employee in the
employment in which he was working at the time of the injury during the period
of fifty-two weeks immediately preceding the date of the injury, including the
subsistence allowance paid to veteran trainees by the United States Government if the amount of such allowance shall be reported monthly by such trainee
to his employer, divided by fifty-two; but if the injured employee lost more than
seven consecutive calendar days at one or more times during such period, although not in the same week, then the earnings for the remainder of such fiftytwo weeks shall be divided by the number of weeks remaining after the time so
lost has been deducted. When the employment prior to the injury extended over
a period of less than fifty-two weeks, the method of dividing the earnings during
that period by the number of weeks and parts thereof during which the employee
earned wages shall be followed, provided results fair and just to both parties will
be thereby obtained. Where, by reasons of a shortness of time during which the
employee has been in the employment of his employer or the casual nature or
terms of his employment, it is impracticable to compute the average weekly
wages as defined in this section, regard shall be had to the average weekly
amount which during the fifty-two weeks previous to the injury was being
earned by a person of the same grade and character employed in the same class
of employment in the same locality or community.
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injured employee in the employment in which he was working at
the time of the injury.. ."26 On a first reading, the issue appears settled by this definition. However, the commission resorted to the second paragraph of the section, which provides a
fifth alternative method. That portion of the section states:
[Wihen for exceptional reasons the foregoing would be unfair,
either to the employer or employee, such other method of computing average weekly wages may be restored to as will most
nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee
would be earning were it not for the injury.2
While it is arguable that the opening statement of the first
paragraph of section 72-4 would apply to the entire section rather
than to only the first paragraph, the court rejected this argument.
As noted by the court:
There is nothing in the statute to indicate that only wages from
a particular employment must be used. The language of the
proviso plainly states that any other method of computing average weekly wages may be used which will fairly compensate the
employee or his dependents. This proviso is to be used when the
other methods fail to produce fair results and is a separate and28
distinct alternative to those previously set forth in the statute.
Furthermore, the court saw no problem with the language of the
section's second paragraph which requires that an "exceptional
reason" be specified by the commission for refusing to apply any
of the section's four delineated methods. The court regarded the
very fact that the combination of wages from both employments
appeared to be the only method which would result in adequate
compensation, a sufficient "exceptional reason" to apply that
method.2 9
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id.

28. 265 S.C. at 170, 217 S.E.2d at 216.
29. Id. In addition, the supreme court quoted language from the lower court as dispositive of the argument that the commission failed to specify any "exceptional reasons"
for refusing to apply one of the methods set forth in the first paragraph of section 72-4:
"The commission, at least by inference, found 'exceptional reason' as required
by the statute, in that the method of computation urged by the employer of
using only the wages earned from it while engaged part-time, would not fairly
reflect the earnings of a man who, with both employers, actually engaged in 70odd productive hours each week ... it is obvious that the mere statement of
the preceding sentence yields the 'exceptional reason' in basic consideration of
the deceased's work productivity ..

Id. at 169-70, 217 S.E.2d at 216.
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The only previous decision in South Carolina involving the
concurrent employment issue is McCummings v. Anderson Theatre Co."° Although the McCummings court regarded its decision
as one "not to be considered as a precedent for the purpose of
computing an employee's average weekly wages within the contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation Act,"3 the Foreman
court relied upon it exclusively. The injured employee in this
earlier case earned an average of $55 to $60 per week as a bricklayer and earned an additional $6 per week working one day a
week as a carpenter for the Anderson Theatre Company. The
employee was injured while on the job with the theatre company,
but the South Carolina Supreme Court, affirming a lower court's
decision, allowed the average wages from the bricklaying employment to be combined with the earnings from the theatre for the
determination of the average weekly wages. The McCummings
court based its conclusion upon interpretation of the fifth alternative by reasoning:
The paragraph says 'such other method' may be resorted to 'as
will most nearly approximate the amount which the injured
employee would be earning were it not for the injury.' There are
only two ways to do this, first, by an arbitrary increase of the
wage, and second, by combination of the average wage received
in the employment in which the employee received his injury
with the average wage received from other regular employment.
The General Assembly did not intend the first 'such other
method' and it logically follows that the second is to be the
rule.3"

It is interesting to note that the North Carolina Supreme
30. 225 S.C. 187, 81 S.E.2d 348 (1954).
31. Id. at 194, 81 S.E.2d at 350-51. It is difficult to ascertain precisely why the
disclaimer of precedential value was given. Perhaps the reason was simply that the court
was aware that "no other method. . . was raised or discussed." Id. See also 2 LARSON §
60.31, at 10-413 n.81.3. That is, the McCummings court might have preferred to consider
some other method of approximating the injured employee's earnings, but realized that
it would be improper to do so since no other methods were presented by either counsel.
When viewed in this light, the cryptic disavowal of its precedential value can be
dismissed more readily. The disavowal would not extend to the propriety of finding some
form of combining or averaging necessary, but only to the reasonableness of finding the
simple addition of all concurrent wages to be the most appropriate of other alternative
methods which might have been raised. See note 41 infra. In any event, the appropriateness of combining an employee's wages from concurrent employments is no longer a
question after the Foreman decision.
32. 225 S.C. at 192, 81 S.E.2d at 350, quoted in Foreman v. Minit Markets, Inc., 265
S.C. 164, 168, 217 S.E.2d 214, 215-16 (1975).
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243

Court, whose decisions are entitled to great respect in this state,33
interpreted the same provision of their Act 34 but reached the op35
posite conclusion. That court in Bernhardt v. Yellow Cab Co.
discussed McCummings and noted that "McCummings is not
authority for any method of computing average weekly wages
under any circumstances."36 The Bernhardtcourt went on to hold
that absent a specific provision for allowing a combination of
wages, it would be unfair for the employer-carrier to pay benefits
for which he has received no premiums. The court observed that
the purpose of the Act "is not only to provide a swift and certain
remedy to an injured workman, but also to insure a limited and
determinate liability for employers. 37 Thus, the court concluded
that although the claimant is victimized by his diligence, only the
38
legislature can remedy the condition.
The overriding consideration in Foreman and McCummings
33. Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 412, 73 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1952), quoting McDowell
v. Stilley Plywood Co., 210 S.C. 173, 181, 41 S.E.2d 872, 876 (1947):
Our Workmen's Compensation Act having been fashioned to the North Carolina
Workmen's Compensation Act, and practically a copy thereof, the opinions of
the Supreme Court of that State construing such Act are entitled to great
respect.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(4).
35. 266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966). Bernhardt had been employed by National
Cash Register Company as a machine maintenance man at an average weekly wage of $68.
He secured a part time job for three nights a week for defendant as a taxicab driver for
$25 a week. One night during a robbery a passenger shot him three times in the head
resulting in permanent disability. The court limited his average weekly wage to the employment in which he was working at the time of his accident. Its main support was found
in the argument that the legislature did not specifically authorize combining wages from
concurrent employments. See text accompanying notes 36-38 infra.
36. Id. at 425, 146 S.E.2d at 483.
37. Id. at 427, 146 S.E.2d at 484.
38. Id. at 429, 146 S.E.2d at 486. Professor Larson has the following to say about the
North Carolina decision:
What makes this decision particularly disquieting is that the court, having
imposed this shocking injustice on the claimants then goes on to append a little
sermonette at the end of the opinion on how tragic this result is:
"This case brings into sharp focus not only the plight of plaintiff Bernhardt, but the current plight of all workers who are concurrently engaged
in more than one employment. . . . It is tragic indeed that plaintiff
should be thus victimized by his diligence and ambition to provide for
his own-particularly since, in our society, voluntary idleness is frequently compensated. Only the Legislature, however, can remedy this
condition." (footnote omitted).
The legislature might well reply: "We did give you the remedy when we provided
that you could use whatever other method you pleased that would most nearly
approximate what claimant would have earned but for the injury."
2 LARSON '§ 60.31, at 10-412 to 413.
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is the unfairness to the workman or his dependents which would
result if the wages were not combined. In contrast, the Bernhardt
decision is bottomed upon consideration of the inequity of forcing
the employer to bear additional liability absent specific legislative approval. As to the balancing of these interests, the Foreman
court observed that they were not of equal weight. The court
pointed approvingly to Professor Larson's observation that
[the] fairness to the employee and fairness to the employercarrier are not symmetrical, and cannot be judged by the same
standard. To this one employee, this one loss is everything-he
has nothing against which to offset it. To the employer. . . this
is just one case among many. . . .Today this employer-carrier

may be saddled with a slight extra cost; tomorrow the positions
may be reversed, and the employer-carrier will be completely
relieved of the cost of an injury to one of its employees in a
concurrent-employment situation, when it happens to be the
other employment in which the injury occurs. This is the essence
of the concept of spreading the risk in a system like workmen's
compensation."
Seemingly, the approach taken by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Foreman is the more enlightened one. It is certainly one which more closely effectuates the principal thrust of
the Workmen's Compensation Act. The opinion, however, is not
without its weaknesses. Of primary significance is the failure of
the court to provide any guidelines for ascertaining when adequate compensation could be achieved through the alternative
method provision rather than the four delineated provisions. The
failure of the court to provide these guidelines will result in one
of two probable interpretations in subsequent cases. The South
Carolina court may conclude that in any concurrent employment
situation, a combination of the wages is the most appropriate
compensation. Alternatively, the court may limit the use of this
fifth method to situations where the delineated methods were
"considerably less than the employee's actual proved earning
capacity." 4 Similarly, the Foreman court is less than clear as to
whether the "total combination" method is required in all cases
or whether some other formula would be deemed appropriate.
39. 2 LARSON § 60.31, at 10-414 to 415, quoted in 265 S.C. at 169, 217 S.E.2d at 216.
40. 265 S.C. at 169, 217 S.E.2d at 216.
41. In their brief, appellants suggested two other methods of computing the average
weekly wage in addition to the similar employment method discussed in note 18 supra.
Rather than focusing on the similarity of the duties in the concurrent employments,
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Despite these weaknesses, however, the result in this case was
correct, comporting with the equitable character of the fifth alternative method.
II. FOOD STAMP AcT OF 1964
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Cross v.United
States42 that a district court, upon a de novo review of an administrative action under the Food Stamp Act of 1964,13 may reduce
an administratively imposed sanction even though a violation of
the Act has been admitted. In reaching this decision the court
overruled its previous decision in Welch v. United States" which
held that once the Act has been violated, a district court cannot
substitute its own concept of a just and proper remedy in place
of the Secretary of Agriculture's determination, so long as the
sanction imposed is within the allowable range of the statute and
implementing regulations. After the Cross ruling, it appears that
violators of the Act in the Fourth Circuit have a right of judicial
review of sanctions imposed by the Secretary-a right not enjoyed by violators in any other circuit where the issue has been
considered. 5
appellants asserted that the similarity of the risk of injury in the two employments should
control. This approach would seem fair to the insurance carrier who bases the premiums
on the amount of risk involved rather than the line of employment. The other method
suggested is to compute the amount the claimant would have earned had he been working
on a full-time basis for the employer by whom he was employed at the time of the injury.
Of course, applying either of these methods to the Foreman situation would reduce the
average weekly wage considerably but would seem more fair to the employer-carrier. See
Brief of Appellants at 18, 19.
42. 512 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
43. 7 U.S.C. § 2011-2026 (1970).
44. 464 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1972). The facts of Welch are almost identical to those in
Cross. After admitting violations of the Act, plaintiff was disqualified from the food stamp
program for a period of 60 days. Thereafter, he contested the period of disqualification by
exercising his right of administrative review but the Food Stamp Review Officer upheld
the sanction. An action was filed in district court to review the validity of the administrative action. Plaintiff asserted that the 60-day period of disqualification was unduly harsh
and arbitrary under the admitted facts. The district court reduced the period from 60 to
30 days on the ground that the 60-day period was unduly harsh for the nondeliberate type
of violations committed by plaintiff's agents. In reversing the district court, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals simply resorted to cases decided in the other circuits which held
upon statutory construction that "(tihe statute authorizes a review only on the merits
of the case, and not on the period of disqualification." Id. at 684, quoting Martin v. United
States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1972). See also Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States,
442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1971); Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F. Supp.
534 (D.N.J. 1971); Marbro Foods, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
45. But see note 60 infra.
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Plaintiff, James Cross, operated a rural South Carolina grocery store. Since 1968, he had been authorized to participate in
the federal food stamp program, conditioned upon the requirements of the Food Stamp Act that stamps be accepted only for
eligble food items" and that no money be given in exchange for
stamps in excess of 49 cents change.47 Plaintiff had been warned
by program field officers on two occasions prior to 1969 that violations of either or both of these requirements could result in his
disqualification from participation in the program. Department
of Agriculture agents made five investigatory shoppings of plaintiff's store in 1971 due to an abnormally high volume of food
stamp redemptions. On each of the five shoppings a clerk accepted food stamps for ineligible items, and on several occasions
gave change in excess of 49 cents in food stamp transactions.
Having been advised of these violations, plaintiff replied that the
offending clerk had a problem of excessive drinking, which rendered him incapable of carrying out instructions regarding food
stamps. After receipt of plaintiffs response, the Regional Office
of the Food Stamp Division recommended disqualification from
participation in the program for 90 days. However, the Acting
Director of the Food Stamp Division in Washington increased the
disqualification to one year." This decision was based on the
apparent store policy of selling nongrocery items and the prior
46. 7 C.FR. § 272.2(b) provides:
Coupons shall be accepted by an authorized retail food store only in exchange
for eligible foods as defined in 270.2(i) of this chapter.
The definition given in 7 C.F.R. § 270.2(i) is as follows:
'Eligible food' means any food or food product for human consumption except
alcoholic beverages, tobacco, those foods which are identified on the package as
being imported, and meat and meat products which are imported.
47. 7 C.F.R. § 272.2(e) provides:
If change in an amount of less than 50 cents is required, the eligible household
shall receive the change in cash. At no time may cash change in excess of 49
cents be returned to an eligible household.
48. 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (1970) provides inter alia:
Any approved retail food store or wholesale food concern may be disqualified
from further participation in the food stamp program on a finding, made as
specified in the regulations, that such store or concern has violated any of the
provisions of this chapter, or of the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter.
Such disqualification shall be for such period of time as may be determined in
accordance with regulations issued pursuant to this chapter. The action of disqualification shall be subject to review as provided in section 2022 of this title.
7 C.F.R. § 272.6(a) (1970) states:
Any authorized retail food store, authorized meal service, or authorized wholesale food concern may be disqualified from further participation in the program
by FNS for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed three years . . ..
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warnings ignored by plaintiff, both of which fell within agency
guidelines for recommending and making final determinations.
Plaintiff's counsel sought and obtained review by the Food
Stamp Review Officer, but the one year disqualification was affirmed. Plaintiff then sought review in the district court. He never
disputed that his clerk had violated the food stamp regulations
but sought a de novo review of the period of disqualification. The
district court characterized the sanction as harsh but, relying on
the majority opinion in Welch, declined to review the severity of
the sanction. 9
The scope of judicial review concerning the Food Stamp Act
is governed by the interpretation attached to section 2022 of the
Act. In relevant part, the section states:
If the store or concern feels aggrieved by such final determination he may obtain judicial review thereof by filing a complaint
against the United States in the United States District Court
....
The suit ... shall be a trial de novo by the court in which
the court shall determine the validity of the questioned administrative action in issue. 0
On its face, section 2022 may be read either as limiting the trial
de novo to an independent determination of whether a violation
has occurred, or as extending it to a review of the sanction imposed for the violation. However, the Cross majority made only a
passing attempt to construe the pertinent language of the Act,
before proceeding to the due process principles upon which it
based its decision.-' It was held that the food stamp program,
while not a right, was a privilege, and the participants should be
guaranteed due process.5 2 Furthermore, the court found that none
49. 512 F.2d at 1216.
50. 7 U.S.C. § 2022 (1970).
51. The majority stated in the text of their opinion:
Other considerations, such as legislative history and application of the ordinary
canons of statutory construction, aside, we think that because of the method by
which the fact of violation and the penalty are determined, due process requires
that § 2022 be construed to give the district court a measure of revisory power
over the sanction if it determines that the fact of violation has been proved.
512 F.2d at 1216 (footnotes omitted).
In a footnote to the statement above, the majority stated that the two key phrases in
§ 2022 are "trial de novo" and "validity." "Trial de novo" was construed to imply a fact
finding review only, while the word "validity" would imply a limitation on the court's
review of the agency's sanction. They further noted that "[iun a sense, our opinion is an
explanation of what we believe 'validity' must be held to mean." Id. at n.4.
52. In support, the majority cited Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) which
held:
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of the administrative proceedings allowed under the Act had
granted plaintiff a full hearing in which he could "confront his
accusers, cross-examine or test their credibility, or have a determination by an impartial fact finder. 5' 3 The court concluded

that:
Since, as we have shown, full procedural due process is not
provided at the administrative levels where the fact and duration of disqualification are determined, we think that § 2022
must be read to afford it in the district court so as to preserve
the regulatory scheme from constitutional attack. .

.

.It is the

sanction imposed, once a violation of the Act or regulations has
been found, that constitutes the deprivation of property, not the
mere fact of violation, and the Constitution requires that due
process be afforded before that deprivation becomes effective.
It is unclear why the majority adopted the due process construction of section 2022 especially since neither party raised the
issue. Perhaps the one year disqualification, which at first blush
appears disproportionate to the violation itself, and the severe
economic impact resulting therefrom, may have induced the
adoption of such an approach.55
Judge Widener in his concurring opinion correctly noted,
however, that the majority exceeded its bounds by resorting to
[Tihis Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon
whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a "right" or as a "privilege."
Id. at 374, quoted in Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1217 n.5 (4th Cir. 1975) (en
banc),
53. 512 F.2d at 1216. Interestingly, the majority cites Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932) in support of their due process argument. Although this case has never been overruled, it is also generally known that it has never been followed. See R. PARKER, ADMImsTRATIVE LAW, 112 (1952); Forkosch, Judicial De Novo Review of Administrative QuasiJudicialFact Determinations,25 HASTINGS L.J. 963 (1974).
54. 512 F.2d at 1217 (footnote omitted).
55. The majority states:
We recognize that disqualification from participation in the food stamp program
is not a criminal sanction. At the same time, that disqualification may have
grave economic consequences to a retailer engaged in business in a depressed
economic area where there is wide-spread use of food stamps. In such an area
one who holds himself out as a retailer of food would be cut off from a substantial
segment of the buying public if he is disqualified from engaging in food stamp
transactions.
Id.
It appears that the majority was striving to allow review of plaintiff's harsh disqualification. Since at this time all other circuits which had considered the question including
the Fourth Circuit in Welch, had held by statutory construction that no review was
available, the majority's only avenue seemed to be due process principles.
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constitutional issues rather than applying a logical construction
of the section. 6 He asserted that a review of the administrative
sanctions is required from a literal reading of the statute. Simply
stated, an "administrative action" always consists of both a finding of a violation and then a penalty imposed for the violation.
Congress has provided in section 2022 for a de novo review of
"administrative actions," therefore, the harshness of the penalty
should also be reviewed by the district court. 7 This reasoning is
5 a strikconsistent with the dissent in Martin v. United States,"
ingly similar case, wherein Judge Edwards stated that a trial de
novo "gives to the reviewing court all the power to enter a disposition or judgment different from that originally entered.""9 A later
Fifth Circuit decision 0 found ample basis for construing section
2022 as allowing review of the sanction imposed without resorting
to due process principles.
Judge Russell, in a most persuasive dissent, noted that hearings and the rights of confrontation and cross-examination are
meaningless when the violation is admitted. He contended that
an admission of a violation was analogous to an admission of an
offense by a criminal defendant - where such admissions exist,
all rights to an adjudicatory hearing are thereby waived. In a
criminal proceeding, a valid distinction is drawn between the
adjudicatory hearing and the imposition of the penalty. The former must provide due process in full," while the latter only requires "the right to make a plea in mitigation, though the right
56. Judge Widener opined:

Further, there are deeply imbedded principles that courts should decide constitutional questions only if necessary, and should construe statutes in a manner

which requires decision of a serious constitutional question only if the statutory
language leaves no reasonable alternative.
512 F.2d at 1219 (citations omitted).

57. Id.
58. 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir. 1972) (Edwards, J., dissenting).

59. Id. at 302.
60. In Goodman v. United States, 518 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit
unanimously adopted the concurring opinion of Judge Widener and rejected the majority's
application of due process principles. The Goodman court stated:
Cautioned by the principle that courts should, where possible, construe statutes
in a manner which obviates the resolution of serious constitutional questions,
• . . we reach the same result as the Fourth Circuit in Cross but arrive at our

conclusion by a construction of what seems to us the plain language of the
statute and a consideration of the inner workings of the Act, rather than an

external application of the considerations of due process.
Id. at 509-10.
61. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
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is not a 'constitutional right essential to fundamental fairness.' "I2
Since the Secretary of Agriculture had allowed the plaintiff an
opportunity to demonstrate mitigating circumstances, Judge
Russell reasoned that there were no constitutional violations.
Both the majority and the dissent in Cross discussed Butz v.
Glover Livestock Commission Co., 63 a Supreme Court decision
reiterating the well established "arbitrary or capricious" standard as it applies to the review of an administrative sanction. In
reversing the circuit court which had found the suspension unconscionable, the Butz court referred first to the proposition that
an administrative choice of sanction "is peculiarly a matter for
administrative competence," 64 and then ruled that sanctions
administratively imposed are to be overturned on judicial review
only if "unwarranted in law or . . . without justification in

fact." 5 The Supreme Court proceeded to quote approvingly the
language of the court of appeals below that "so long as the remedy
selected does not exceed the agency's statutory power to impose
and it bears a reasonable relation to the practice sought to be
eliminated, a reviewing court may not interfere."66 The Cross
majority interpreted this to allow the reviewing district court first
to grant a trial de novo and then to proceed to the determination
of the sanction as arbitrary or capricious. To the contrary the
dissent would have simply applied the arbitrary or capricious
standard to the facts and the statute already established. 8
62. United States v. Leavitt, 478 F.2d 1101, 1104 (1973) quoted in 512 F.2d at 1223.
63. 411 U.S. 182 (1973).
64. Id. at 185, quoting American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
65. Id. at 185-86.
66. Id. at 186 n.3, quoting Glover Livestock Comm'n Co. v. Hardin, 454 F.2d 109, 114
(8th Cir. 1972).
67. In establishing the proper method of review, the majority stated the district court
would be warranted in exercising its authority to modify the penalty "only in those
instances in which it may be fairly said on the de novo record as a whole that the Secretary
. . . has abused his discretion by acting arbitrarily or capriciously ....
" 512 F.2d at
1218.
68. Judge Russell noted:
When the violation as admitted authorizes a disqualification that is "allowable" under both the Act and the administrative regulations . . ., and the
Secretary has imposed that disqualification (which is this case since "the Secretary did not impose a penalty exceeding that permitted by the statute or regulations"), a Court has no right to inquire into "the * ** gravity of the violations"
so as "to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." After all, whether a
violation of the Act is to be excused or not is for the Secretary and not the
Courts.
Id. at 1227.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss3/1

16

Stoudenmire:
Administrative
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW Law

1976]

The problem with the majority's reasoning is that it apparently mandates a de novo hearing in order to review the arbitrariness or capriciousness of the imposed sanctions. It would appear
that once the violation has been admitted and the record before
the court is uncontested, the requirement that the district court
conduct a de novo hearing would effectuate no legitimate purpose. The obvious argument that the record could then reflect
more forcefully the issue of mitigation is diminished by the fact
that the same result could be achieved by other means with less
delay. 9 Moreover, as noted by Judge Russell, an application of
such a procedure would open wide all administratively formulated remedies to judicial review.70 This would clearly constitute
"an impermissible intrusion into the administrative domain." '
III.

SOUTH CAROLINA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

In 1972 the South Carolina General Assembly enacted the
Freedom of Information Act 72 which allows the public a right of
access to "public records" as well as "public meetings." The development of state Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA) has been
a phenomenon of the past quarter-century, with only two states
presently without such legislation.73 This trend has evolved from
the belief that people have a right to know and be informed of
governmental activity.74 Due to the lack of common law75 and
69. Indeed, if the evil which the court seeks to avoid is the deprivation of property,
then the remedy fashioned by the court should certainly be one which could be more
quickly accomplished.
70. 512 F.2d at 1227. The Cross opinion is ambiguous as to the question of whether
the right to a de novo review of the sanction is predicated upon some showing by the
plaintiff as to its invalidity or whether it is a matter of right. Throughout the majority's
opinion the latter view prevails. The court, however, does point out that "[in the instant
case, there may be room to question the validity of the sanction . . . ." Id. at 1218
(footnote omitted). The inference being that such a question is necessary prior to judicial
review. Yet by not defining what quantum is necessary for such a showing, the court
apparently was content to allow the review as a matter of right. The point should not be
lost that in doing so, the court may be subjecting itself, as well as administrative agencies,
to prolonged and meritless litigation.
71. 411 U.S. at 188, 189.
72. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-20 to 20.4 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
73. The two states without FOIA laws are Mississippi and Rhode Island. A stinging
criticism of Mississippi's failure to enact a FOIA is found in Comment, Open Meetings
Laws:An Analysis and a Proposal,45 Miss. L.J. 1151 (1974). For a compilation ofjurisdictions with FOIA's, see id. at 1151-52 n.3. Since that comment was published two more
states have enacted FOIA's: New York (N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 88 (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1975)) and West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-1 to 6 (Cum. Supp. 1976)).
74. See generally H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953); F. THAYER, LEGAL
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constitutional guidelines, 6 the task of formulating standards to
insure the public's "right to know" has fallen on Congress" and
the state legislatures.
Florence Morning News, Inc. v. Building Commission of the
City and County of Florence79 is the first major case decided by
the South Carolina Supreme Court involving the recently enacted
state FOIA.80 By modifying the lower court's balancing approach,
the Supreme Court has indicated that the public's right of access
to public records and public meetings is absolute unless
specifically limited by the Act.
CONTROL OF THE PRESS (3d ed. 1950); J. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY (1956).

This belief in the citizen's right to governmental information was eloquently stated
in a letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, dated August 4, 1822.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their
own governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular
government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a
prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both.
Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (August 4, 1822), reprinted in Preface to J.
WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY at vii (1956).
75. For a detailed discussion of the development of common law rights of access to
public records and meetings, see H. CRosS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW, 25-29, 180-89
(1953).
76. The possible constitutional basis of these rights is discussed in Parks, The Open
Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1957); Note, Access to Official Information:A Neglected Constitutional
Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209 (1952). See also Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights
for the "Right to Know," 75 HARv. L. Rv. 1199 (1962); Comment, Open Meetings Laws:
An Analysis and a Proposal, 45 MIss. L.J. 1151 (1974); Comment, The FirstAmendment
and the Public Right to Information, 35 U. PITT. L. REv. 93 (1973).
77. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) (current version at 5
U.S.C.A. §552 (Supp. 1976). For a survey of federal agency litigation, publications, and
regulations under the FOIA, see S. THURMAN, THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION FROM
THE GOVERNMENT (1973).
78. See note 73 supra.
79. 265 S.C. 389, 218 S.E.2d 881 (1975).
80, See note 72 supra. The earlier case of Martin v. Ellisor, 264 S.C. 202, 213 S.E.2d
732 (1975), dealt only with the issue of the proper court in which an action under the FOIA
may be brought. Section 1-20.4 states that "[alny citizen of the State may apply to the
circuit court for injunctive relief to enforce the provisions of this article in appropriate
cases." An action was brought in Richland County Court to compel the Executive Director
of the South Carolina Election Commission to allow claimant to copy computer tapes
containing lists of the names of registered voters compiled by the Election Commission.
The supreme court held:
The General Assembly was dealing with a specific subject matter, that is, the
right of citizens to information about the operation of their government; and,
in express terms, conferred jurisdiction of this specific subject matter upon the
circuit court. We construe the statute as a legislative direction that these specific rights would best be enforced in the circuit court, a court of general jurisdiction, rather than in a county court of limited jurisdiction.
Id. at 206, 213 S.E.2d at 733-34.
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Pursuant to state law, 8' the defendant Commission in this
action was authorized to make regulations regarding the rights of
the public and of prisoners confined in the Florence Detention
Center. On November 14, 1974, the Commission held its regular
monthly meeting. After lengthy discussion of the issue, it was
declared that the jail book, a record of daily arrests within the
detention center, was no longer open for inspection by the general
public. This policy was passed for several reasons. First, the jail
book was kept in the area where prisoners were booked, presenting security problems to the public. Secondly, there had been
several complaints that attorneys and bondsmen were using the
jail book in order to obtain clients. Finally, the Commission felt
that the booking process would be more efficient without public
2
intervention.1
Thereafter, a reporter from the Florence Morning News requested access to the jail book and the minutes of the November
14th meeting. Having been denied both documents, plaintiff filed
suit. In addition to seeking an injunction requiring the Commission to disclose these records, plaintiffs petitioned the court to
require that all Commission meetings be open to the public.
Shortly thereafter, on December 12, 1974, the Commission held
another closed meeting, discussing primarily their actions regarding the lawsuit filed against them. There were, however, discussions of other general business matters which did not pertain to
83
the lawsuit.
The lower court found that the Commission was a "public
agency"84 and the documents in question were "public records"85
CODE ANN. §§ 59-567 to 567.4 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
82. See Record at 120-21, 128, 145-46.

81. S.C.

83. 265 S.C. at 395, 218 S.E.2d at 884.
84 S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975) defines the term thusly:
"Public agency" means any department of the State, any State board,
commission, agency and authority, any public or governmental bodies or political subdivisions of the State, including counties, municipalities, townships,
school districts and special purpose districts, or any organization, corporation
or agency supported in whole or in part by public funds, or expending public
funds; and includes any quasi-governmental body of the State and its political
subdivisions including, without limitation, such bodies as the South Carolina
Public Service Authority and the South Carolina State Ports Authority.
85. "Public records" is defined by the Act to mean:
the records of meetings of all public agencies and includes all other records
which by law are required to be kept or maintained by any public agency, and
includes all documents containing information relating to the conduct of the
public's business prepared, owned, used or retained by any public agency, re-
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within the meaning of the Act. The Commission could not realistically contest this first finding since they easily fell within the
Act's catchall definition of "public agency" which encompasses
all bodies "supported in whole or in part by public funds, or
expending public funds.""5 Nor was the second finding, that the
documents were public records, really in dispute. However, the
Commission did argue that under an exception to the definition
of "public records," the public interest would best be served by
not disclosing the jail book to the public. 7
Using traditional equity principles, the Florence County
Court of Common Pleas proceeded to balance the opposing interests of the public and the Commission."8
I agree with the Building Commission that the presence of
the plaintiffs and members of the general public in the area
where the records in question are now kept is not in the best
gardless of physical form or characteristics. Records such as income tax returns,
medical records, scholastic records, adoption records and other records which
by law are required to be closed to the public shall not be deemed to be made
open to the public under the provisions of this article, nor shall the definition
of public records include those records concerning which it is shown that the
public interest is best served by not disclosing them to the public. Provided,
however, nothing herein shall authorize the disclosure of records of the Board
of Bank Control pertaining to applications and surveys for charters and
branches of banks and savings and loan associations; or surveys and examinations of such institutions required to be made by law.

Id.
86. See note 84 supra.
It is believed that the "public funds test" offers the most definitive standard
for determining whether a particular body falls within an open meetings law. If
an agency, committee, commission, council, board, or any other body is not
supported by, responsible for, or charged with the appropriation or collection of
any public moneys, it seems that the "public" label would not apply, nor would
there be a compelling need for opening meetings to the public.
Comment, Open Meetings Laws: An Analysis and a Proposal,45 Miss. L.J. 1151, 1166
(1974).
87. It is unfortunate that even the most obvious public documents cannot be clearly
established as "public records" under the FOIA without a court decision. It appears that
this exception provides a substantial loophole for agencies seeking to justify non-disclosure
of their records. The public's right of access would be delayed until a court weighed the
nature and purpose of the public records sought to be opened to the public against the
effect which disclosure would have on the public welfare. The real danger lies in the lack
of adequate statutory or common-law guidelines for courts making this determination.
88. The court weighed one "public interest"-security of the public within the Detention Center-against another "public interest"-right of access to public records and
found the latter controlling. Such an approach is mandated by the language; however, the
court should have ceased its balancing at this point. Once a record is deemed "public,"
the Act requires full disclosure.
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interest of the security and maintenance of the Florence Detention Center. . .

On the other hand, the Commission should

take action to make these records available to the plaintiffs and
members of the public who desire to see them at some other
reasonable time and place. I would suggest that the records be
copied on a daily basis and that the plaintiffs and

. . .

public

be allowed to view said copies in the office of the Building Commission ....11
The lower court also held that all meetings of the Commission
must be open to the public unless excepted by the act."0 Since the
December 12 closed meeting was primarily for "the receipt of
89. Record at 180.
90. Id. at 182. Section 1-20.3 of the FOIA states the general rule requiring open
meetings but allows exceptions for various reasons:
(a) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all meetings, formal
or informal, special or regular, of each public agency of the State shall be open
to the public.
(b) Executive sessions shall be permitted only for the purpose of discussing or considering: (1) Employment, appointment, compensation, promotion,
demotion, discipline, or release of an employee, administrative briefings and
committee reports; (2) negotiations incident to proposed contractual arrangements and proposed sale or purchase of property, the receipt of legal advice,
settlement of legal claims, or the position of the public agency in other adversary
situations; (3) private matters presented by individuals or groups of citizens.
Executive sessions shall not be called for the purpose of defeating the reason or
the spirit of this article.
(c) Nothing in this article shall be construed: (1) To prevent public agencies which administer the licensing of persons engaging in businesses, occupations or professions from holding executive sessions to prepare, approve, grade
or administer examinations. All official actions resulting from such examinations shall be a matter of public record.
(2) To prohibit a public agency or the South Carolina Probation, Parole
and Pardon Board or the State Election Commission from holding an executive
session to deliberate on a decision to be reached based upon evidence introduced
in a public proceeding before it. At the conclusion of such deliberation, further
proceedings shall be public.
(3) To require the disclosure in meetings of matters otherwise prohibited
by law from being disclosed.
(4) To prevent any executive agency from holding an executive session to
consider matters affecting the security of the State or Nation.
(5) To prevent any executive session to consider the conferring of honorary
degrees or the acceptance of gifts, donations and bequests which the donor or
proposed donor has requested in writing to be kept confidential.
(d) Committees and subcommittees of the General Assembly or any public agency, board or commission may, upon majority vote of its membership,
conduct executive sessions.
(e) Sessions of the General Assembly may enter into executive sessions
authorized by the Constitution of this State and rules adopted pursuant thereto.
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legal advice," 9' the exclusion of the public was held appropriate.2
On appeal, the supreme court modified the lower court's
opinion by requiring the Commission to grant access to the original jail book. "Inspection of a copy of daily entries made in the
jail book is not the equivalent of the statutory right to inspect and
copy the original record." 3 Additionally, the court found that
"the exclusion of plaintiffs from the meeting of December 12
while unprivileged matters not related to the lawsuit were discussed, as well as the refusal of access to those minutes, consti94
tuted further violations of the Act."
The balancing approach adopted by the lower court was not
entirely without supporting authority. Within the federal courts
there exists a trend to similarly balance the equities between
legitimate governmental interests and the rights of the public
granted by the federal FOIA.9 5 The district court in Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration"
justified its balancing of interests doctrine on the amount of judicial discretion apparently granted by the federal Act. The Act
specifies that when information is withheld, "[o]n complaint,
the district court . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any
agency records improperly withheld from the complainant."" In
Consumer's Union the court stated that this provision of the Act
conferred equity jurisdiction upon it and that it must therefore,
"according to traditional equity principles, weigh the effects of
disclosure and non-disclosure and determine the best course to
98
follow at the present time.
91. It is readily apparent why the legislature allowed executive sessions for the receipt
of legal advice. An unfair advantage would inure to the adversary in the lawsuit should
the discussions of the lawsuit be open to the public. In addition, matters previously
considered confidential under the attorney-client relationship would become a matter of
public record.
92. Record at 184.
93. 265 S.C. at 396, 218 S.E.2d at 884.
94. Id. at 397, 218 S.E.2d at 884.
95. See note 77 supra.
96. 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Plaintiff sought an injunction under the Federal Act to compel defendant to disclose records of the VA's hearing-aid testing program.
Defendant asserted that four of the nine specific exemptions excused it from disclosing
the information. Despite a finding that defendant did not meet any of the nine exemptions, the court went on to apply the balancing test and barred access to part of the
information.
97. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970) (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp.
1976)).
98. 301 F. Supp. at 806. Other federal courts, however, have refused to adopt this
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While the South Carolina Act similarly provides a complainant only with injunctive relief,"' the supreme court correctly eschewed the Consumers Union analysis. The guiding star of the
South Carolina FOIA is openness, as evidenced by the General
Assembly's declaration that:
it is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed in an open and public manner as it conducts its business
so that citizens shall be advised of the performance of public
officials and of the decisions that are reached in public activity
and in the formulation of public policy. Toward this end, this
act is adopted, making it possible for citizens, or their representatives, to learn and to report fully the activities of their public
officials. 0"
Such a declaration implicitly places the burden of proof on the
agency seeking to prevent disclosure. The effect of the Consumers
Union analysis is to shift the burden to the plaintiff. Moreover,
while the interests of the Commission in not disclosing the jail
book certainly appear valid, the legislature, in adopting the Act,
has already accounted for these interests by providing exceptions
to the disclosure rule. In addition to providing only these specific
exceptions, other statutory language evidences a legislative intent

to limit judicial discretion.''
balancing approach. For example, one court rejected the balancing approach with the
following observation:
After considering voluminous testimony on both sides and balancing the public,
private, and administrative interests, Congress decided that the best course was
open access to the governmental process with a very few exceptions. It is not
the province of the courts to restrict that legislative judgment under the guise
of judicially balancing the same interests that Congress has considered.
Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Douds v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n. 242 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1957); Cf. Wirtz v. Alapaha Yellow Pines
Prods., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
99. See note 81 supra. The act has subsequently been amended to provide equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate and to impose criminal penalties for any person or
group who wilfully violate the act. See note 101 infra.
100. No. 1396, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2585-86.
101. Section 1-20.2 of the Act, dealing with access to public records, states emphatically:
Reasonable access to these records and reasonable access to available facilities
for the full exercise of the right to inspect and copy such records shall not be
denied.
Section 1-20.3(a) evidences an intent to cover the wide spectrum of public meetings by
providing:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all meetings, formal or informal, special or regular, of each public agency of the State shall be open to the
public. [Emphasis added.]
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The South Carolina FOIA contains many exceptions' 2 to the
general requirement that all public meetings be open, which, if
construed liberally, would provide easy circumvention of the
Act's primary purpose. In fact, the large number of exemptions
appear to make open meetings the exception rather than the rule.
A too liberal interpretation of these potential loopholes would
allow a public agency to close an entire meeting by showing only
that some portion of the meeting related to one of these exceptions. Fortunately, the supreme court has interpreted one such
loophole narrowly by holding that a mere showing of a particular
exempt discussion does not justify the exclusion of the public
from the entire meeting. In its decision in FlorenceMorningNews
the supreme court has set forth a precedent establishing that
disclosure is the rule rather than the exception.
B. Joel Stoudenmire
Finally, the last sentence of § 1-20.3(b) states that "[e]xecutive sessions shall not be
called for the purpose of defeating the reason or the spirit of this article."
In addition, it should be noted that the Act was apparently strengthened by amendments subsequent to Florence Morning News.
Section 1-20.3 was amended by adding at the end:
Prior to going into executive session the public agency shall vote in public on
the question and when such vote is favorable the presiding officer shall announce the purpose of the executive session. Any formal action taken in executive session, shall thereafter be ratified in public session prior to such action
becoming effective. As used in this subsection 'formal action' means a recorded
vote committing the body concerned to a specific course of action.
No. 608, [1976] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1629.
Section 1-20.4 was amended to read:
Any citizen of the State may apply to the circuit court to enforce the provisions
of this act in appropriate cases, provided such application is made no later than
sixty days following the date which the alleged violation occurs or sixty days
after ratification of such act in public session, whichever comes later. The court
may order equitable relief as it deems appropriate.
In addition to the relief provided in this section, any person or group of
persons who wilfully violate the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than one hundred
dollars or imprisoned for not more than thirty days.
Id. Although the provision imposing criminal sanction probably presents an insurmountable burden of proof to establish a "wilful" violation, it does evidence the legislature's
intent of requiring strict compliance with the Act.
102. See note 90 supra.
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